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Introduction
The conflict in Greater Darfur region since February 2003 
has driven 3 million people from their homes and led to the 
death of about 180,000. While over 200,000 of the affected 
people fled to neighboring Chad, the majority of them live 
as IDPs in various camps numbering over 100 mostly near 
the main towns in the region. This sudden influx of people 
in huge numbers increased the demand for basic services 
such as water and sanitation which where unavailable or 
insufficient anyway prior to the coming of the IDPs to their 
new refugee areas. 
The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), 
is an INGO that has been working in various parts of Sudan 
for the last 27 years in the fields of relief and development. 
ADRA’s first intervention in west Darfur State was in 2004 
in Kirinding IDPs camp with a sanitation and hygiene pro-
motion project in which 1,000 household pit latrines were 
constructed from June-October. Kirinding is one of the 
eight (8) IDPs camps around Gineina the capital of West 
Darfur state and is located 2 km south of the town.  It had 
a total population of 23,000 in August 2004 but this has 
since increased. 
Obstacles to the intervention 
There were numerous problems faced by ADRA and other 
NGOs that were among the first ones to intervene in west 
Darfur State but the main ones were:
1. Lack of qualified local manpower and implementation 
partners.
2. Poor infrastructure and communication (air transport 
costly, poor roads -transport by roads takes 3 to 4 weeks 
but could be even months during the rainy seasons when 
some roads and streams become impassable).
3. Insecurity caused by the warring factions and banditry.
4. Poor coordination of activities by the state authorities
 who were understaffed, inexperienced and over 
 stretched by the intervention.
5. Exorbitant prices (3-4 times higher than in Khartoum).
6. Delay in obtaining permission to intervene and permits 
for expatriate staff due to very long Humanitarian Aid 
Commission (HAC)2 bureaucracy as government  policy 
of restricting foreigners from entering the region.
Solutions for the emergency sanitation 
intervention in Kirinding camp
Slabs made of Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC) material were 
introduced as an emergency sanitation solution for the IDPs 
in West Darfur by UNICEF at the beginning of the inter-
vention but they were too fragile and could not with stand 
excessive handling and transportation.
In addition to the slabs problem were others such as loose 
formation, insufficiency and therefore expensiveness of 
latrine construction materials such as cement and reinforce-
ment iron rods in the local market. To be efficient and to also 
minimize costs, the following solutions had to be adopted 
for the emergency sanitation intervention in Kirinding 
camp. They were decided upon by ADRA in collaboration 
with the Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) unit 
of West Darfur State Water Corporation (SWC) which has 
the expertise in sanitation problems of the area:
1. A circular shaped pit with a diameter of about 0.5 m was 
used to give strength to the walls and avoid collapse of 
the loose sandy formation since pits were not lined.
2. Pick axe replaced by specially designed but simple and 
cheap tool for pit digging. The tool was a one meter long 
metal rod of 3cm size sharpened at one or both ends. 
Darfur is a remote marginalized area in western Sudan that has numerous problems such as lack of basic services,  inse-
curity, access, etc,. To respond to the emergency challenges of providing sanitation services to the thousands of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in West Darfur, appropriate realistic fast solutions had to be adopted in order to overcome 
numerous obstacles at levels of the emergency sanitation interventions and alleviate the suffering of the IDPs. The most 
important solution for success was better coordination among NGOs themselves. The needs of the host community who in 
Darfur are in most cases no much better off than the IDPs had to be taken into consideration to avoid conflicts between 
the two groups or between the host community and NGOs.   
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Photograph 1. Circular shaped pit
3. A san plat slab design measuring 60m x 60m was adopted 
instead of the 75mx75m size normally used. This reduced 
quantity and consequently cost of latrine construction 
materials such as cement and iron rods which in West 
Darfur cost 3-4 times the price in Khartoum. Another 
advantage of the reduction of the slab size was that its 
weight was reduced which in turn reduced the burden it 
exerted on the placement wooden poles.
4. Sacks filled with sand-an abundant commodity in the 
area obtained free of charge were used to cover the rest 
of the pit not covered by san plat slab.
5. Only 6-7 wooden poles used for placement of slabs.
6. Superstructure made of grass mats (locally available) or 
plastic sheet.
7. Pits depths limited to about 3m due to loose formation 
and also shallow water table.
Household latrines construction 
procedure
The first step began with siting of the pit latrines and registra-
tion of families by the Sanitation Supervisor. The Supervisor 
also monitored pits digging with assistance from the CHPs to 
make sure they were dug to the right dimensions. Due to the 
emergency nature of the project, ADRA paid the households 
as an incentive, SD1500 per meter dug and SD500 for each 
superstructure erected.  As their contribution, the community 
had to transport the latrine construction materials from the 
slabs production site to their households. They also filled 
the sacks with sand and placed them near ready pits. ADRA 
was responsiblefor providing digging tools, san plat slabs, 
wooden poles, bamboos, sacks, grass mats and plastic sheet 
(obtained from UNICEF) to the community. ADRA was also 
responsible for placement of slabs and pits covering. 
Challenges to the intervention in 
Kirinding IDPs camp
1. Circular pit more difficult to dig due to limited maneu-
verability than rectangular or square shaped one.
2. Pits digging tool not as fast as pick-axe. The sharpened end 
of the tool was smaller than that of a pick axe therefore 
removing very little soil at a time. So the process of pit 
digging was slower. 
3. Lack of space for erecting household latrines: For fear 
of attacks from the Janjaweed (a government militia), 
most of the IDPs were forced into very small crowded 
camps in “safe areas” though their populations were big. 
In Kirinding, there were 23,000 IDPs living in an area 
of about 2 km2 in size. The IDPs faced difficulties even 
with construction of shelters for their residence due to 
this limit in land. Availability of space for construction 
of pit latrines was therefore even much more limited. 
4. Some members of the community were unwilling to 
use pit latrines: In their villages of origin, prior to their 
displacement, the IDPs didn’t have/use pit latrines. They 
helped themselves in the bushes. So the culture of using 
pit latrines was an entirely new one for the majority of 
them and they couldn’t understand its benefits. 
5. Threats of attack from host community because they 
were not included in the project: Kirinding sanitation 
project like most other NGOs’ interventions in Darfur 
at the beginning of the conflict targeted IDPs. The host 
communities, some of whom lived adjacent to the IDPs, 
saw this as discrimination by NGOs against them since 
they too lacked basic services that were being provided 
to IDPs. They therefore, threatened NGOs and IDPs 
alike with attacks if they were not provided with basic 
services too. A community of Janjaweed living south of 
the camp threatened to disrupt our activities on several 
occasions if we didn’t include them in the project. 
Photograph 2. San plat slabs
Solution to the challenges
1. Pit shape and digging: As a solution to challenges 1 and 
2 above, we asked people and they agreed to work in 
groups of mainly 2-3 persons to speed up pits digging 
process. As a result, most pits were completed in only 
2 days compared to 4 or more days when dug by an 
individual.
2. Lack of space for latrine construction: Through the 
Sheikhs3 who are influential among their respective 
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communities, we initiated negotiations with neighbor-
ing families to come up with appropriate and acceptable 
solutions to them. This sometimes meant 1 or 2 families 
shifting the location of their residential shelter to make 
space for a pit latrine for their neighbor; in some cases 
2 neighbors agreed to dig and share one pit latrine. 
3. Unwillingness of some members of the community to 
use pit latrines: The project had a hygiene promotion 
component and ten Community Hygiene Promoters 
(CHPs) supervised by one Social Mobilizer were em-
ployed for this role. They sensitized the community on 
better hygiene practices, among them the importance of 
using latrines. They did this through household visits and 
public awareness campaigns-using drama, and songs; 
this made people unwilling to use latrines aware of their 
importance. Sheikhs who are listened to by their people 
were specifically targeted so that they could influence 
the behavioral changes needed in their communities. A 
month from commencement of the project, there was 
a positive response from the community and even pits 
digging speeded up.
4. Threats of attacks from host community: We decided to 
construct 50 latrines for the neighboring community to 
avoid conflict with them since like the IDPs, they too 
lacked basic services such as sanitation facilities. First, 
we held meetings with their Sheikh and elders and ex-
plained our position. They narrated their problems to us 
and promised never to threaten us or the camp again.
of activities. Some NGOs found that their interventions 
were exactly the same as those of other NGOs working 
in the same camp.  In Kirinding camp, ADRA found out 
that SCF/US was also executing a sanitation project. 
This came about due to lack of proper coordination and 
supervision by the state authorities. There was also the 
issue of standards with some NGOs using different slab 
sizes for instance.
 To solve these problems it was agreed to:
• Coordinate sanitation and other interventions both at 
state and national levels. At the state level, WATSAN 
coordination meetings were held on a weekly basis 
and UNICEF was assigned the role of the lead agency 
for this sector. The meetings were chaired by them 
but later on the chairmanship went to WES. INGOs 
with WATSAN interventions also had their own 
coordination meetings separate from the above. 
• Appoint a lead NGO for each IDP camp to avoid du-
plication of activities. The role of the lead NGO was 
to assess the camp’s needs and report the information 
at the coordination meetings. NGOs with expertise 
in the activity concerned would then be requested to 
intervene in the particular camp.
2. Costs of NGOs operations in Darfur were very high for 
reasons already mentioned at the beginning of the paper. 
The idea of cost sharing whenever applicable was adopted 
to minimize costs. In Kirinding ADRA and Islamic Relief 
Worldwide (IRW) shared the cost of constructing pit 
latrines for a health centre and a school.
3.  Some donor agencies had previously not been contented 
with the huge costs of NGOs operations budget for 
Darfur and the slow pace of projects implementation. 
As a solution, the NGOs encouraged them to pay regular 
visits to the area to see the situation for themselves first 
hand. This was very important because after the visits 
the donors had a clear picture of what challenges the 
implementing NGOs were going through. 
Conclusions
1. The involvement of Sheikhs in decision making was a 
crucial factor for the project. This is because they are 
listened to by their people and they can influence the 
behavioral changes needed in their communities.
2. The decision taken to better coordinate sanitation ac-
tivities by NGOs was one main reason that enhanced 
their service delivery and lead to maximization of their 
in puts. It also ensured that there was no duplication of 
activites.
3. In a complex situation like Darfur, taking the host 
population’s basic needs into consideration is vital as 
was done in Kirinding project. Failure to recognize their 
suffering and find an amicable solution could lead to 
conflict between them and the NGOs and or IDPs which 
could jeopardize the project. 
Photograph 3. Superstructure covered 
with a plastic sheet
Solutions to improve NGOs performance 
on the ground
1. In the rush to provide basic services for the IDPs in the 
camps in Darfur in the early days of the intervention, 
there were problems caused by lack of proper coordination 
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Note/s
1 Sudanese Dinar (US$1=SD 220)
2 A government body responsible for regulating and co-
ordinating humanitarian aid activities in the country. 
3 Clan/ tribal leaders.
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Photograph 4. Superstructure made of grass mats
Figure 1. Map of Sudan showing location of West Darfur State
